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1 Introduction: An incompatible triad
Frege’s Logicism has been subject to a variety of different interpretations.
The following three thesis have individually been associated with key aspects
of Frege’s philosophy, yet they are jointly incompatible:
Informativeness Arithmetical identity statements are informative because
the senses of the expressions flanking the identity sign are distinct.
Analysis Arithmetical identity statements are analysable into logical iden-
tity statements by providing (term by term) sense-preserving analyses.
Logical Identity Logical identity statements are logically true in virtue of
an identity of senses of the expressions flanking the identity.
The three claims constitute an incompatible triad: [Informativeness] requires
that the expressions flanking an informative arithmetical identity are distinct.
According to [Analysis], there is a corresponding logical identity which prop-
erly captures the senses of the original arithmetical expressions. Yet, given
[Logical Identity], the relevant logical identity will be such that the two sides
flanking the identity sign express the same sense. Something, it seems, has
to go.1
Given that there is little doubt amongst Frege scholars that Frege was
indeed committed to [Informativeness], the two natural avenues to resolve the
1The presentation draws on (Milne, 1989) which inspired much of the discussion. Milne
does not explicitly state [Analysis] in his discussion but he seems to suggest that Frege
is subject to this kind of incompatibility. Milne mentions (Currie, 1982) for bringing the
issue to his attention while crediting (Thiel, 1968) for first raising a similar puzzle.
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triad are to argue against [Analysis] or against [Logical Identity].2 With the
exception of the last section, where I briefly discuss a rejection of [Analysis],
I will here mainly focus on [Logical Identity]. The main theme of this paper
can be motivated as follows:
If we accept [Logical Identity], we have to interpret Frege—at least before
the discovery of the paradox—as holding the view that the constituent clauses
flanking the main identity of his infamous basic law V:
(BLV) (—εf(ε) = —αg(α)) = ( a f(a) = g(a))3
express the same sense. For simplicity, I will label this more specific claim:
BLV Synonymy Constituent clauses flanking the main identity of basic
law V express the same sense.
Proponents of [BLV Synonymy] provide additional support by drawing on
the more general thesis which Frege purportedly held:
Abstraction Synonymy Constituent clauses of an abstraction principle
express the same sense.
Support for this interpretation is sometimes drawn from the observation
that in Grundlagen Frege seems to regard the constituent clauses of the di-
rection abstraction principle or of Hume’s Principle4 as expressing the same
content.5 The main aim in the next two sections is to challenge [Abstraction
Synonymy] and [BLV Synonymy] more specifically as adequate interpreta-
tions of Frege’s philosophy. If successful, we can then assess the prospects of
rejecting [Logical Identity] to avoid the incompatible triad.
2[Analysis] is suggested by numerous passages in Frege, compare the discussion in
(Blanchette, 2012), p.79–82. [Logical Identity] is defended most prominently in (Sluga,
1986), p.60 and see also (Sluga, 1980), p.156.
3In words: The value range of the function Φ(ξ) is identical to the value range of the
function Ψ(ξ) if and only if the function Φ(ξ) and the function Ψ(ξ) always have the
same value for the same argument (i.e. they are co-extensional). BLV has the form of an
abstraction principle:
M(f) = M(g)↔ f ≈ g
where M is a term-forming operator applicable to expression of the type of f and g and
≈ is an equivalence relation on entities denoted by expressions of that type.
4Direction Abstraction is an abstraction principle that fixes the identity conditions of
directions by appeal to parallelism of lines (to be discussed below). Hume’s Principle, a
principle that is defended by the Neo-Fregeans in their reconstruction of logicism, fixes
the identity conditions of cardinal numbers by appeal to equinumerosity as the relevant
equivalence relation. Compare (Wright, 1983) and (Hale and Wright, 2001).
5I will focus here only on the relevant content/sense identity claim with respect to
the constituent clauses of an abstraction principles. Cf. (Picardi, 1993), p.76. Of course,
how best to understand the notion of content in Grundlagen will be discussed in more
detail below. Part of the difficulties in interpreting this notion arises from unresolved
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2 Abstraction Synonymy: Grundlagen
Let us distinguish four different phases in Frege’s development that relate
to [Abstraction Synonymy]. Accordingly, there is the early period, which in-
cludes the publication of Begriffsschrift in 1879, the middle period, which
covers the period from the publication of Grundlagen der Arithmetik in 1884,
up to but excluding the publication of “Function und Begriff ” in 1891. Then
there is what may be called the mature period: the period that begins with
the introduction of his famous sense–reference distinction in “Function und
Begriff ” and which includes his magnum opus Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
published in two volumes in 1893 and 1903; Frege’s late period, then, com-
prises his main writings after he abandoned his theory of value-ranges (it is
admittedly difficult to date the start of the late period).
Most Frege scholars maintain that Frege adopted [Abstraction Synonymy]
during his middle period with respect to the notion of content. To name
but a few: Beaney, Blanchette, Burge, Currie, Dummett, Milne, Picardi,
Sluga, Sullivan, and Weiner.6 Some interpreters argue that Frege did not
adopt [Abstraction Synonymy] after introducing the sense–reference distinc-
tion, and that he did reject [BLV Synonymy] in Grundgesetze. Most notably
here are Dummett, Klement and Landini.7 Others such as Beaney, Burge,
Curry, Milne, and Sluga argue that Frege was committed to [Abstraction
Synonymy] and [BLV Synonymy] during the mature period, in particular in
his Grundgesetze. In the following, I will first look at numerous passages
in Grundlagen to investigate whether Frege did entertain [Abstraction Syn-
onymy] during his middle period and then proceed to investigate the relevant
writings of his mature period. With the exception of one passage, I will leave
aside a detailed discussion of Begriffsschrift, i.e. his early period, since what
is most relevant for my discussion is Frege’s attitude towards sameness of con-
tent/sense of the relevant sides of an abstraction principles—this issue first
arises in Grundlagen. Also, I will not discuss in detail Frege’s views post Rus-
question of how to interpret Frege’s notions of (judgeable/conceptual) content and identity
in Begriffsschrift and to what extend these views transfer to Grundlagen. For example,
on one interpretation, “sameness of judgeable content” is fairly weak and merely requires
provable equivalence. As I will argue below, Frege adopted a stronger notion of sameness
of content in Grundlagen.
6Compare: (Beaney, 1996), (Beaney, 2005), (Blanchette, 2012), (Burge, 1990), (Currie,
1982), (Dummett, 1981) (Dummett, 1991b), (Dummett, 1991c), (Milne, 1989), (Milne,
2014), (Picardi, 2012), (Sluga, 1986), (Sluga, 1986), (Sullivan, 2007), and Weiner (personal
correspondence).
7(Dummett, 1991c), chapter 14, (Klement, 2002), and (Landini, 1996) who also main-
tains that provided identity of content requires more than provable equivalence, Frege
never adopted [Abstraction Synonymy] in any period.
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sell’s paradox—most notably his famous article “Logik in der Mathematik”
written around 1914. This paper requires separate treatment and since, as
I think is most likely, Frege had given up on his theory of value-ranges by
1914, I’m not confident that the claims made in “Logik in der Mathematik”
about logic are a reliable guide to interpret Frege’s attitude towards basic
law V during the mature period.8
Let us first discuss the famous passage of Grundlagen which is regarded
as the “birth-place” of [Abstraction Synonymy]. In this passage, Frege does
not consider BLV but he discusses the direction abstraction principle which
introduces the concept direction by means of the equivalence relation paral-
lelism. Given, however, that Frege claims that similar considerations apply
to other abstraction principles, scholars draw on this passage in support of
[Abstraction Synonymy] more generally.9 It is worth quoting the passage in
full:10
“The judgement: “the line a is parallel to the line b”[A1], in signs:
a // b,
can be regarded as an equation. When we do this, we obtain the
concept of direction and say: “the direction of line a is equal to
the direction of line b”[A2]. | Thus, we replace the sign // by the
more general =, by distributing (vertheilen) the specific content
of the former between a and b. We split up the content in a
way different from the original and gain thereby a new concept.
Often, of course, one conceives of the matter the other way round,
and some teachers define: parallel lines are those whose directions
are equal. [. . . ] Too bad, however, that thereby the true order
8This cautionary remark requires further research. Nonetheless, the following is worth
noting: assuming that the discovery of the inconsistency not merely had major formal
consequences for Frege’s logicism but likely affected Frege’s philosophy as a whole, in
particular his epistemology of logic, Frege’s views on logic and its epistemology might well
have changed significantly sometime after he came to realise that his revised basic law V′
is not fit for the logicist task (likely sometime after 1906)—indeed he later gave up on
logicism altogether. Hence, I think that one should treat with much caution quotations
from his later period with regards to an epistemology of logic that are then used to support
an interpretation of Frege’s views about logic, in particular about basic law V, during the
middle or mature period.
9He writes in a footnote to §65 “The essentials of this discussion can easily be trans-
ferred to the case of number-equality”—that is the abstraction principle known as Hume’s
Principle. Thus, there is reason to think that these considerations apply to other abstrac-
tion principle as well.
10All translations of Frege’s original are by the author, apart from the quoted passages
of Grundgesetze which are based on (Frege, 2013).
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of things is reversed. For surely everything geometrical must
originally be given in intuition. Now, I may ask if anyone has
an intuition of the direction of a line? Of a line, certainly, but
does one further distinguish in one’s intuition this line from its
direction? Hardly so! This concept of direction is only to be
discovered by means of an intellectual activity which starts from
an intuition.”
(Frege, 1884), p.74-5.
Most scholars interpret Frege as suggesting that the idea of splitting up
content11 results in [A1] and [A2] having the same content. However, Frege
does not explicitly say that the right- and left-hand side of the direction
abstraction have the same content. What he does say is this:
“Thus, we replace the sign // by the more general =, by dis-
tributing the specific content of the former between a and b. We
split up the content in a way different from the original and gain
thereby a new concept.”
Frege does not claim that the resulting content of the whole clause [A2] is
exactly the same as that of the clause [A1]. In fact, in the first sentence,
he does not even mention the content of the whole constituent clause [A1],
but he focuses on the content of the sign “//”. The second sentence of the
quotation then picks up on “the” content. Admittedly, the original here is
ambiguous and it can be “the” content of the sign “//” or “the” content of
[A1] that Frege is referring to. Whatever it is, although the definite article
suggest that there is one content (i.e. of the sign or of [A1]), he does not say
explicitly that the resulting content of [A2] has to be the same. Frege’s main
emphasis in this passage is something very different. He is concerned with
the process of concept-formation: that, by splitting up a specific content,
we can constitute, and grasp for the first time, a new concept—in the given
case, the concept of direction. Whether there is sameness of content of the
relevant sentences is not the main issue; instead, by drawing attention to
the form of an abstraction principle, he presents us with an effective means
for introducing a new concept.12 This method, of course, does not require
11Frege uses “zerspalten” which is rendered using “split up”—a choice of translation
also shared by Dummett in (Dummett, 1991c), p.168. Austin uses “carve up” in his
translation which is appropriate but often used by others in a possibly misleading manner:
interpreters have used “to recarve” or indeed the phrase “recarving of content”, which
suggests that the content remains the same—a claim I’m about to challenge.
12That this means of forming new concepts does not suffice as a definition proper is
shown in the ensuing passages of Grundlagen. The feature of concept-constitution of an
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the content of the new concept in [A2] to be identical to some concept that
figures in [A1], however, it does not seem to require either that the two sides
[A1] and [A2] have the same content—there is, after all, a creative element
in the method of splitting up content.13 So, in contrast to most interpreters,
I believe that §64 alone does not provide enough support for [Abstraction
Synonymy].14
In fact, the remainder of §64 seems to raise a serious challenge for the
proponent of [Abstraction Synonymy]. Having presented the idea of splitting
up content, Frege maintains that [A2] cannot be used to define the content
of [A1] because the latter only is rooted “in intuition”. So we might wonder:
if he really thought that both propositions express the very same content,
what is it then about [A1]—if not its content—that makes it explanatorily
prior to [A2]? We are owed an explanation of how Frege could make this
priority claim while maintaining [Abstraction Synonymy].15
So what other evidence is there in Grundlagen to support [Abstraction
Synonymy]? First, there are similar sounding passages. So, for example, he
writes in §62:16
“In our case, we have to explain (erkla¨ren) the sense of the propo-
sition
‘the cardinal number which belongs to the concept F is
the same cardinal number which belongs to the concept
G’;
i.e. we have to express the content of that sentence in a different
way, without using the expression
the cardinal number, which belongs to the concept F’.”
abstraction principle plays a fundamental role in the Neo-Fregean approach and is further
discussed in (Ebert, 2016).
13Frege later writes in Grundlagen that “Fruitful determinations of concepts draw bor-
derlines that were not yet given before” §88. A very similar remark already appears in his
“Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift” from 1880/81. See (Frege, 1983), p.39.
14Landini is the most notable exception here. He offers independent reasons to reject
[Abstraction Synonymy] and [BLV Synonymy] as suitable interpretations of Frege’s work
in (Landini, 1996) and more recently in his monograph (Landini, 2012).
15Compare here Dummett who writes: “Frege eventually decided that A2 cannot ac-
tually serve to define A1, [. . . ]; this by itself should have warned [Frege] that there was
something amiss in holding them to have the same content”. (Dummett, 1989), p.7. Al-
ternatively, there is something amiss in ascribing to Frege [Abstraction Synonymy]. See
also (Mancosu, 2015) who discusses the history of the second part of the quote at length
and identifies the “teachers” that have reversed the true order of things.
16Similarly, see his conclusions in §106.
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(Frege, 1884), p.73.
Granted, it is again very tempting to interpret Frege as endorsing the view
that the different expressions capture exactly the same content, even though
this is not explicitly said.17 After all, he does not say “we have to express
the same content in a different way”—a phrase Frege did use before in §8 of
Begriffsschrift as the mark of a content-equality (Inhaltsgleichheit). What
seems to be required here, rather, is that the new expression suffices as a
general characteristic mark for the equality of numbers; that is not yet to
say, however, that such mark is to have the very same content. At least this
is not an explicit requirement.
Contrast this with §9 of Begriffsschrift, published in 1879, where he
presents a (superficially) similar model for recognising new entities—in this
case: functions—by extracting them from the content of an already under-
stood proposition. Here, Frege allows for different ways of decomposing a
proposition by which we arrive at a function, and in doing so he is very
explicit that this kind of decomposition does not change the content of the
proposition. He writes: “This distinction [between function and argument]
does not affect the conceptual content....” (Frege, 1879), §9, p.15 and sim-
ilarly on p.17.18 In contrast, the above passages from Grundlagen are not
explicitly claiming that the contents of [A1] and [A2] are the same. While
some might interpret this lack of explicitness as a kind of Fregean sloppi-
ness, I take it to be a sign that Frege did not commit himself to [Abstraction
Synonymy] with respect to the notion of content in these passages.
Finally, the strongest evidence for [Abstraction Synonymy] can be found
in §65, where he summarises the results of the procedure of splitting up
content and writes:
“the line a is parallel to line b” is gleichbedeutend with “the di-
rection of line a is identical to the direction of line b.”
(Frege, 1884), p.75.
Now, Frege could have said that the two statements have “the same content”
or express a “content-equality”, or even use the phrase “co-contentual” (“in-
17Austin’s translation uses “define” for both “erkla¨ren” and “definieren”. Since,
definiens and definiendum suggests that they are sense identical, yet explanans and ex-
planandum need not be, I prefer to use “explain” rather than Austin’s “define” as a
translation of “erkla¨ren”. See also (Rossberg, 2015b) who develops a more precise inter-
pretative basis for this distinction in Frege’s Grundgesetze.
18Dummett argues that Frege arrives at [Abstraction Synonymy] by “false analogy” to
the model of analysis offered in §9 of Begriffsschrift, compare (Dummett, 1989), p.5. If
my suggestion is correct, Dummett overstretches the presumed analogy since the model
of §64 is not intended to be content-preserving.
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haltsgleich”) but he refrains from saying that. According to Frege, the effect
of splitting up a specific content into a new one is that the two propositions
are gleichbedeutend. Now, this is not a mere one-off occurrence of the use
of gleichbedeutend. Throughout Grundlagen, Frege uses the word “content”
usually with respect to specific propositions. He does not, however, use a
relational phrase such as “A has the same content as B” (or cognates such
as co-contentual). One natural reading of Frege’s choice of words is that he
simply intends to use “ [A] is gleichbedeutend mit [B]” to mean—excuse the
pun—that [A] and [B] have the same content. It is very tempting to do so,
however let me explore an alternative reading where these two notions are
kept distinct.
Firstly, Frege uses the notion gleichbedeutend with respect to proposi-
tions for which it isn’t immediately obvious that they also express the same
content. So, for example, Frege writes in §81:
The proposition
“if every object, to which x stands in the relation φ,
falls under the concept F, and if from d falling under the
concept F, whatever d is, it follows that every object, to
which d stands in the relation φ falls under the concept
F, then y falls under the concept F, whatever concept
F may be.”
is to be gleichbedeutend with
“y follows x in the φ series”
and with
“x precedes y in the φ-series.”
(Frege, 1884), p.94.
Most interpreters would treat this passage as akin to a definition, i.e. Frege
would here be interpreted as suggesting that the former statement has the
same content as the latter. Yet, if we took seriously the idea that propositions
can be gleichbedeutend without necessarily being co-contentual then we arrive
at a possibly more charitable interpretation of this and other passages in
Frege.19
19Indeed it would help to resolve another Fregean conflict discussed at length by Dum-
mett and more recently by Blanchette: If Frege held a fine-grained cognitive criterion
of thought/content-individuation according to which “two sentences express the same
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Secondly, even though most interpreters treat Frege’s use of Bedeutung
in Grundlagen as synonymous with Sinn (“sense”) or Inhalt (“content”)20,
it is not clear at all that Frege actually uses them interchangeably. So, for
instance, in the context of a discussion of infinite numbers, in particular the
cardinal number which belongs to the concept “finite natural number” (∞1),
he writes in §84:
“According to our explanations, this is a completely clear and
unambiguous Sinn; and that suffices to justify the usage of the
sign ∞1 and to secure a Bedeutung for it.”
(Frege, 1884), p.97.
Here it is an explanation that fixes the sense of an expression which in turn
secures a Bedeutung for that sign. Frege seems to think that the sense of an
expression is something distinct from its Bedeutung, and the former plays a
role in securing the latter. In fact, Bedeutung has, in this passage, a distinct
“referential” feel, which is anticipatory of his famous distinction. A similar
usage of bedeuten can be found in Frege’s opening sentence of Grundlagen:
“If we raise the question what the number one is, or what the sign
1 bedeute, one will most often receive the answer: well, a thing”.
(Frege, 1884), p.I.
Lastly, Frege writes in Grundgesetze (p.X) that his earlier notion of con-
tent is now split up into what he now calls thought and truth-value, and so
the thought of a proposition is its sense (Sinn), and the truth-value of the
proposition is its reference (Bedeutung). Drawing that distinction in this way
does not imply that he previously treated Bedeutung to be synonymous with
content (or sense for that matter). Admittedly, in his well-known letter to
Husserl21, Frege notes that he had not explicitly drawn the sense–reference
distinction in Grundlagen. Still, revisiting his previous use of these terms
in Grundlagen, he suggests to replace “Sinn” with “Bedeutung” in §§97,
100–102. Interestingly, he does not suggest revisions to §§62–64 nor does he
suggest any revisions to his previous usage of Bedeutung. To be clear, I’m not
claiming that Frege made his famous distinction in Grundlagen.22 Rather,
thought only if they are, roughly, fairly-readily recognizable synonyms” (Blanchette, 2012),
p.80, various equivalences might not turn out to express the same thought or have the same
content even though Frege claims them to be gleichbedeutend.
20An exception here is (Weiner, 2007), p.678f.
21Letter to Husserl, dated 24.5.1891, published in (Frege, 1976), XIX/1, p.96.
22Compare here (Sundholm, 2001). He argues that a draft of Frege’s famous article
Sinn und Bedeutung was written by May 1890; however, he speculates that Frege might
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I’m questioning whether a charitable interpretation of Frege’s Grundlagen
should read him as treating the terms Inhalt (“content”), Sinn (“sense”),
and Bedeutung (and their respective cognates) as synonymous, simply be-
cause he had not yet explicitly drawn his famous distinction.
By way of clarifying my interpretation, let me briefly draw on Dummett’s
highly insightful discussion of §64.23 Dummett is initially hesitant in ascrib-
ing [Abstraction Synonymy] to Frege on the basis of this passage. He writes:
“This way of characterising the transition appears to commit
Frege to holding that the judgeable content of the two sentences
[. . . ] coincides.”
(Dummett, 1991c), p.168, (my italics).
Still, he then argues that in Grundlagen Frege did adopt this thesis.24 Having
ascribed to Frege [Abstraction Synonymy], Dummett shows that adopting it
faces numerous problems. However, he offers a distinction—one he claims
Frege failed to draw—between a fine-grained notion of sense and a course-
grained notion of content. By means of such a distinction, Dummett argues,
Frege could have kept [Abstraction Synonymy] for content, while also claim-
ing that the sense of [A1] and [A2] differ. The reason why I here allude to
Dummett’s discussion will now be clear. Assuming that Frege did not adopt
[Abstraction Synonymy] in the first place, as I argued above, Dummett’s
search for a distinction in Grundlagen has the wrong starting point: Frege
does not require a more fine-grained notion of content, he already has one!
Instead what Frege requires is a more coarse-grained alternative; something
that [A1] and [A2] share by means of “splitting up content”, if they are not
sharing the same content.
The suggestion that I’m putting forth is that we should interpret Frege
as gesturing towards a distinction of this kind as early as Grundlagen. More
specifically, Frege regards [A1] and [A2] to be gleichbedeutend, yet he does
not regard them to have the same content. Crucially, at that time, Frege
did not yet have an adequate account of what it is for two propositions to
be gleichbedeutend. It is only after he came to regard propositions as names
have been influenced by a paper by Moritz Pasch which was published in 1882; it is
unclear, though, whether Frege read that article before 1894. I think there is good ev-
idence in Grundlagen that Frege did not treat the expressions “Sinn” and “Bedeutung”
interchangeably.
23(Dummett, 1991c), chapter 14, in particular, p.168–76.
24Admittedly, Dummett’s attitude changes in the course of eight pages. He later writes
“the synonymy thesis which [Frege] had so vividly expressed [. . . ]” (Dummett, 1991c),
p.176. (Dummett’s label “the synonymy thesis” is the same thesis that I capture by using
[Abstraction Synonymy].) This attitude is again expressed in (Dummett, 1991a), pp.332ff.
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of truths-values and, in turn, truth-values as objects, that he can properly
state what it is for two propositions to be gleichbedeutend.25
So, to summarise, I have raised doubts about the standard view according
to which Frege adopted [Abstraction Synonymy] in Grundlagen. This view
is not explicitly endorsed by Frege and it does require treating “content”,
“sense”, and “Bedeutung” as synonyms even though there are passages that
suggest otherwise. As such, I hope to have challenged the view that the
default position is, once we move to Frege’s mature period, that he endorsed
[Abstraction Synonymy] and with it the more specific [BLV Synonymy] once
he adopted BLV. Of course, more will have to be done properly to develop
various repercussions of this interpretation of Grundlagen. Here is not the
place to pursue this and so I will turn to Frege’s mature period and inves-
tigate whether there is better support for [Abstraction Synonymy] or [BLV
Synonymy].
3 BLV Synonymy: From Function und Be-
griff to Grundgesetze
The most compelling evidence in support of [BLV Synonymy] can be
found in “Function und Begriff ”. Having just introduced the sense–reference
distinction, Frege writes:
“. . . so that we have in
—ε(ε2 − 4ε) = —α(α · (α− 4))
the expression, that the first value-range is the same as the sec-
ond. [. . . ]
x2 − 4x = x(x− 4)
expresses, if it is understood as [explained] above, though [zwar ]
the same sense, but in a different way”.
(Frege, 1891), p.10-11.
This passage is, no doubt, the clearest indication of a commitment to [BLV
Synonymy]. Even though the claim is not made with respect to BLV but a
25In fact, I think, that Grundlagen is best understood as a mere informal introduction
to Frege’s logicism which is lacking in detail and is in various ways “unfinished”. Hence,
that he made use of a distinction for which he did not yet have a detailed account might
not be too surprising in this wider context.
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specific instance of it, it is natural to generalise Frege’s view to apply to the
general law.26 Interestingly, in his “Ausfu¨hrung u¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung”,
a manuscript written around 1892-95, so just after “Function und Begriff ”,
Frege does not reiterate that claim. Instead, he writes with respect to a very
similar case that we here have
“essentially [im wesentlichen] the same thought”.
(Frege, 1983), p.132.
This seems to indicate an important change in Frege’s attitude. Frege appears
somewhat hesitant and he stops short of asserting that the two sides express
the same sense or thought. According to Frege, we have overlap (or strong
similarity) of sense or thought between the two expressions, but the use of “im
wesentlichen” (essentially) carries the implicature that he is not committing
himself to the thought-identity claim. Some interpreters have suggested that
Frege’s endorsement of [BLV Synonymy] in the earlier “Function und Begriff ”
was a slip and that we should not read too much into it since Frege only just
introduced the sense–reference distinction.27 I think that Frege was likely
initially tempted by [BLV Synonymy], yet he gave it up soon thereafter,
opting instead for the view expressed above: that the thoughts overlap but
they are not identical.28
While “Function und Begriff ” is a published lecture that Frege gave in
Jena and “Ausfu¨hrung u¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung” is part of a manuscript
that was not published during his lifetime, it will be instructive to look at
26I pass over a further complication here. The original concept-script expression of basic
law V is a “Roman marker” as it contains Roman letters and as such does not express a
thought. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is not really coherent to claim that the two sides
of basic law V express the same sense. Rather, the claim made by proponents of [BLV
Synonymy] should be that for any instance of basic law V, the constituent clauses flanking
the main identity express the same sense. Alternatively, we could characterise the view
more precisely as one which interprets the main clauses of basic law V as each containing
a second-level relational expressions (roughly: f and g have the same value-range, and: f
and g always have the same value for the same argument) and so [BLV Synonymy] amounts
to the claim that those second-level relational expressions have the same sense. In what
follows, I will ignore this complication. (Many thanks to Richard Heck for discussion on
this point).
In the above quotation, ‘x’ is a Roman letter, and even though numerous scholars quote
this passage adding a quantifier to the second formula it is not present (nor should it be
present) in the original.
27See for example (Klement, 2002), p.87, and (Dummett, 1981), p.532.
28We should not be surprised that Frege never officially acknowledged this change. As
Dummett once wrote: “That Frege never publicly acknowledged that he had been wrong
[. . . ] is no proof that he did not change his mind: he was never very good at confessing
past errors.”(Dummett, 1991c), p.176.
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the views Frege defended in what he took to be his most important work,
namely Grundgesetze der Arithmetik—the culmination of an intellectually
very productive phase from 1884-93. Here, Frege is very careful to note that
the two sides of BLV are co-referential but he never identifies them has having
the same sense. So, when in §3 he introduces the natural language analogue
of BLV, having just outlined in §2 his sense–reference distinction, he writes:
I use the words
“ ‘the function Φ(ξ) has the same value-range as the
function Ψ(ξ)’
always as co-referential (gleichbedeutend) with the words
‘the functions Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) always have the same
value for the same argument.’ ”
(Frege, 1893), p.7.
That Frege opts to use “co-referential” only is striking and we should thus
interpret Frege’s initial stipulation in §3 as presenting the right and left hand
side of BLV as having the same reference, which, of course, does not by itself
imply sameness of sense. This does not only present a striking continuity in
Frege’s usage of the term (going back as far as Grundlagen), but additional
support for this reading can be drawn from §10. Frege here reminds the
reader in a footnote that to put forth two sides of a “permutation” of BLV
as co-referential does not imply that they share the same sense. He writes:
“For then ‘X(—εΦ(ε)) = X(—αΨ(α))’ too is co-referential (gleichbe-
deutend) with ‘ a Φ(a) = Ψ(a)’.” [footnote]: “Thereby it is not
said that the sense is the same.”
(Frege, 1893), p.16.
Thus, gleichbedeutend (“being co-referential”) in §10 has to be understood as
a cognate of Frege’s technical use of Bedeutung and does not by itself imply
sameness of sense. Given this reminder and given that Frege introduces the
sense-reference distinction in §2, we have, I believe, conclusive evidence that
Frege’s initial stipulation in §3 has be understood in the same way: he only
stipulates co-referentiality. Of course, such a stipulation is compatible with
[BLV Synonymy], and Frege’s reminder in §10 does not imply that he denies
[BLV Synonymy]—after all he does not consider BLV in that passage—but
given that all Frege has done in the initial stipulation of §3 is to stipulate
sameness of reference, it does not provide sufficient grounds to regard both
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sides of BLV as having the same sense. That is an additional claim that
requires additional support.29
One way to gather such support is, for example, to argue that Frege was
inconsistent in his usage of gleichbedeutend. This could be argued for on the
basis of §27 of Grundgesetze. Here, Furth decides to translate the occur-
rence of gleichbedeutend using the more general “is the same in meaning”—
implying sameness of sense and reference—instead of his usual “denotes the
same as” (sameness of reference). He thinks that Frege uses gleichbedeutend
in a non-technical sense in what follows:30
“By means of a definition we introduce a new name by determin-
ing that it is to have the same sense and the same reference as
a name composed of already known signs. The new sign thereby
becomes co-referential [gleichbedeutend ] with the explaining sign;
the definition thus immediately turns into a proposition” (Frege,
1893), p.44-45.
Pace Beaney31 I do not regard this passage to be an indication that at least
sometimes gleichbedeutend is also meant to imply sameness of sense and that
Frege oscillates between a technical use and a non-technical use of that term.
Also, I do not think that this passage should be treated as a slip. Rather,
this passage indicates that what is important to Frege when it comes to
definitions is that they effect co-referentiality. It is the co-referentiality of the
two sides of a definition that is required for their employability in a proof,
it is the co-referentiality that warrants taking a definition as a true identity
statement, and thus, it is the co-referentiality that puts us in a position,
as Frege continues, “to cite a definition just like a proposition, replacing
the definition-stroke by a judgement-stroke.” This emphasis on Bedeutung,
rather than Sinn, is important to Frege in Grundgesetze and it is echoed in
his review of Husserl in 1894. He writes:32
“Here, a discrepancy manifests itself between the psychological
logicians and the mathematicians. The former are concerned with
29Interestingly, (Simons, 1992) treats the footnote to §10 as evidence that Frege did
adopt [BLV Synonymy], yet I’m unclear why he thinks that. Admittedly, Simons thinks
the passage merely offers a “hint”. (Schirn, 2006), in contrast, argues against Simons
and suggests that this passage does not constitute direct evidence for or against [BLV
Synonymy].
30Compare (Frege, 1964), p.83fn of Furth’s translation.
31See (Beaney, 2005), p.296, compare also his important (Beaney, 1996) chapter 5.
32Compare also (Simons, 1992) who rightly draws attention to the fact that Frege has
little concern for the notion of sense in Grundgesetze. Similar passages to the one quoted
here can be found in his Ausu¨hrungen u¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung (“Comments on sense
and reference”) in (Frege, 1983), p.133ff., which were written around the same time.
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the sense of words and with ideas, which they fail to keep apart.
The latter is concerned with the subject matter itself, with the
reference of words.”
(Frege, 1894), p.183.
Another way to support [BLV Synonymy] is to think of the stipulation of BLV
as more akin to a definition, which would, according to §27, guarantee that
the two sides express the same sense and have the same reference. However,
Frege reminds us in (Frege, 1903), §146, p.147 that the transformation which
is embodied by BLV is not a definition since it does not meet the requirements
he set out for a definition proper. Also, nowhere in Grundgesetze does Frege
suggest that the transformation involved in BLV requires or even implies
sameness of sense. Instead, to justify its use, he notes that many logicians
and mathematicians have implicitly made use of it, and he claims to merely
make its widespread implicit use explicit by stating it as a basic law of logic.33
In fact, Frege has a different attitude towards BLV than to his other
logical laws in Grundgesetze. In the foreword, he singles it out as the one
principle about which a dispute may arise and writes:
“I take it to be purely logical. At any rate, the place is hereby
marked where there has to be a decision.”
(Frege, 1893), p.VII.
Importantly, Frege does not here acknowledge that a dispute may arise about
the truth of BLV but only about its logicality.34 This interpretation seems
33The passage reads:
When logicians have long spoken of the extension of a concept and mathe-
maticians have spoken of sets, classes, and manifolds, then such a conversion
forms the basis of this too; for, one may well take it that what mathemati-
cians call a set, etc., is really nothing but the extension of a concept, even if
they are not always clearly aware of this.
We are thus not really doing anything new by means of this conversion; but
we do it in full awareness and by appealing to a basic law of logic. And what
we do in this way is completely different from the arbitrary, lawless creation
of numbers by many mathematicians.”
(Frege, 1903), §147, p.148.
It is thus not surprising that Frege writes in the afterword that he is not the only one
affected by the inconsistency: “Solatium miseris, socios habuisse malorum. This conso-
lation, if it is one, is on my side also; for everyone who has made use of extensions of
concepts, classes, sets in their proofs is in the same position.” (Frege, 1903), Afterword,
p.253. Frege mentions Dedekind as a “co-mourner” in the footnote to this quotation.
34I here follow (Heck, 2005) and (Heck, 2007). Compare also (Milne, 2014). This
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to sit well with how he finishes the foreword where he effectively rules out a
discussion about the truth of his basic principles, he writes:
“And I could only acknowledge it as a refutation if someone in-
deed showed that a better, more enduring building can be erected
on different basic convictions, or if someone proved to me that
my basic principles lead to manifestly false conclusions. But no
one will succeed in doing so.”
(Frege, 1893), p.XXVI.
Nonetheless, he grants that it is not easily recognised as a logical truth be-
cause, as he later says in the afterword to Grundgesetze, it always lacked the
kind of obviousness that is to be required of a logical law.35
A natural way to explain this lack of obviousness is that Frege did not
think that the sense on either side of BLV is exactly the same. Indeed, Frege
writes in a letter to Russell:
“Everywhere where the coinciding of reference is not self-evident,
we have a distinctness of sense.”
(Frege, 1976), XXXVI/14, pp.234-5.
So, if Frege did regard the constituent clauses of BLV as expressing the same
sense, he should have also held the two sides of BLV as self-evidently co-
referential and, as a result, BLV as self-evident. Evidently, he did not and
given BLV lacks a feature often associated with a logical principle, Frege
admits that doubts may be raised about its logicality. However, as reflected
in the above quotation, despite lacking this feature Frege still regarded BLV
to be purely logical and to be true. All this suggests that Frege did not adopt
[BLV Synonymy].
interpretation is, no doubt, controversial and faces its own challenges which I cannot
discuss here in full. For example, one may wonder whether to doubt the logical status
of BLV is, ipso facto, to doubt the logical status of value-ranges per se—a doubt that
Frege never seems to have entertained. For what it is worth, I think that the kinds of
doubts Frege seems to allow concern primarily the grounds for regarding BLV as logical,
i.e. whether the grounds are purely logical or whether they involve implicitly an appeal
to intuition for example. As such, no corresponding doubt about the logical status of
the objects picked out by BLV is thereby suggested. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pressing me on this issue.
35He repeats this attitude in “U¨ber Schoenflies: Die logischen Paradoxien der Men-
genlehre” in (Frege, 1983), p.198. He here acknowledges that even before the discovery
legitimate doubts about basic law V could be maintained. But, as I read Frege, these
doubts are about its logical status not its truth.
16
Now, maybe the hesitation that Frege exhibits towards BLV should be
interpreted differently: that Frege is still seeing the relevant senses as if
“through a mist”, that he took himself not yet to have lifted the “mist” that
blurs a proper acknowledgement of the senses and that, ultimately, he was
hoping that he would come to regard BLV as expressing the same sense.36
If that were so and Frege was not sure which exact sense either side of BLV
expresses at the time of Grundgesetze, then surely he would not also entertain
[BLV Synonymy].
Finally, let me briefly mention two more general reasons to interpret Frege
as not adopting [BLV Synonymy]. The first is made by Dummett:37 [BLV
Synonymy] is not easily reconciled with the compositionality thesis endorsed
by Frege in Grundgesetze. He writes in §32 of Grundgesetze:
“Now, the simple or complex names of which the name of a truth-
value consists contribute to expressing the thought, and this con-
tribution of the individual name is its sense. If a name is part of
the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is
part of the thought expressed by the latter.”
(Frege, 1893), p.51.
Here “name of a truth-value” is a proposition (“Satz”) and “name” (sim-
pliciter) can be any kind of referential expression (such as a predicate).
Hence, we here have the “building-block” conception of compositionality,
where senses of subsentential expressions are, quite literally, parts of the
thought expressed. Given that the right- and left-hand side of BLV involve
different concepts that, in turn, have different senses, the two sides cannot
express the same thought. Hence, at least in Grundgesetze, Frege could not
be committed to both [BLV Synonymy] and this conception of composition-
ality.38
36This passage is inspired by Ku¨nne’s extremely insightful discussion in (Ku¨nne, 2009),
p.673-674. He suggest that Frege’s hesitation about BLV might be explained in the way
suggested above, but he does not make the additional claim that a proper acknowledgement
will lead to [BLV Synonymy]. The metaphors used above appear in his “Logik in der
Mathematik” (1914) in (Frege, 1983) and play an important role in (Burge, 1984; Burge,
1990), (Jeshion, 2001), and (Nelson, 2008). However, compare here my footnote 8.
37See, in particular (Dummett, 1991c), p.176, (Dummett, 1989). (Landini, 1996), (Kle-
ment, 2002) and (Heck and May, 2011) develop interpretations of Fregean senses on which
[BLV Synonymy] is false. See (Klement, 2016) for an overview of different interpretation
of Fregean senses.
38With respect to compositionality in Frege, see e.g. (Heck and May, 2011) and (Ku¨nne,
2009), p.654ff. Ku¨nne argues that the Grundgesetze conception of compositionality clashes
with other theses that Frege held around the time of Grundgesetze and draws attention
to weaker readings of compositionality offered in Frege’s other writings.
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Secondly, we can support the view that Frege did not adopt [BLV Syn-
onymy] from the surprising absence of any appeal to [BLV Synonymy] in
Grundgesetze. Not only, as mentioned earlier, does Frege never explicitly
endorse [BLV Synonymy], he also never draws on it as an assumption in
his arguments or when he offers more or less suggestive considerations in
favour of accepting BLV. Granted, Frege provides little positive justification
for BLV—be it either for its truth or its logicality—and emphasises instead
pragmatic considerations in favour of its acceptance.39 For sure, drawing on
the presumed synonymy of the two sides of BLV would not have convinced a
sceptic, but it would have offered some positive support for why it has to be
a logical law or indeed why it has to be true. Strikingly, he never makes this
move, which in turn suggests that Frege did not endorse [BLV Synonymy] in
Grundgesetze.40
So to summarise: in contrast to most interpreters, I believe Frege was
not committed to [Abstraction Synonymy] about content during the middle
period. Hence, there is no prima facie reason to interpret Frege as endors-
ing [Abstraction Synonymy] regarding sense or the more specific [BLV Syn-
onymy] in his mature period. Quite the opposite, given that it is doubtful
that Frege did entertain [Abstraction Synonymy], there is a prima facie rea-
son not to interpret him as accepting [BLV Synonymy] and, as I tried to
show, there are strong independent grounds to interpret Frege as rejecting
[BLV Synonymy] from 1893 onwards.
4 The Incompatible Triad: Logical Truth and
Analysis
Having argued that Frege did not adopt [BLV Synonymy] during his ma-
ture period and having offered some reasons to be doubtful that he actually
entertained [Abstraction Synonymy], let me highlight a number of issues that
arise from this interpretation.
First, does the rejection of [BLV Synonymy] provide a lead out of the
incompatible triad? What is obvious is that if Frege did reject [BLV Syn-
onymy], he could not also adopt [Logical Identity]. After all, one of his basic
39Compare fn 33 above.
40Interestingly, Frege never mentions the more general [Abstraction Synonymy] in
Grundgesetze either. Indeed, as observed by (May and Wehmeier, 2016), Frege does not
even consider Hume’s Principle as an abstraction principle in Grundgesetze, but he only
discusses either its right to left or its left to right side in isolation. Hence, the more general
issue about [Abstraction Synonymy] does not really arise in his mature period. This again
seems to fit well with a rejection of [BLV Synonymy] and of [Abstraction Synonymy].
18
laws of logic does not fit this characterisation. As a result, we may resolve the
incompatible triad by rejecting [Logical Identity]: there are logical identity
statements that are true and logical, yet do not express the same sense on
either side of the main identity sign. Hence, it seems, there is now no barrier
to accounting for informativeness by appeal to distinct senses, even if, given
[Analysis], it is at bottom a logical one.
Now, one possible doubt may remain: on the interpretation that I have
offered, Frege regards BLV as more or less a “special case” about which a
debate of its logicality might reasonably arise. Hence, or so a challenge could
go, it might still be that in the case of logical identities that are (indisputably)
logical, sense identity of the constituent clauses has to hold. Thus, the objec-
tion may go, I have not yet fully ruled out the possibility that there are some
informative arithmetical identities that once reduced to a logical identity, are
such that they are sense identical. Granted, there is such logical space, but
it is very hard to motivate such a view, let alone provide reasons for thinking
that Frege himself might have adopted it. After all, given that Frege accepts
that a basic logical law which takes the form of an identity does not have
identical senses, why would he require of non-basic logical identities that their
constituent clauses have identical senses?41 Hence, I seriously doubt there is
a way to resurrect a version of the incompatible triad having rejected [Logical
Truth].42 In what follows, I will highlight a striking consequence of rejecting
[BLV Synonymy] for our understanding of [Analysis].
Namely, if Frege did not adopt [BLV Synonymy], then given certain as-
sumption about how Frege intends to translate an arithmetical statement
into a logical one, he also has to reject [Analysis]. To see this, consider
Blanchette’s detailed—and to my mind correct—account of how Frege’s in-
tended analysis is meant to transform an arithmetical truth into a logical
truth.43 She convincingly shows how Frege’s intended analysis involves an
appeal to (a version of) basic law V. That is, in order to arrive at a logical
identity (analysans) which is meant to capture the very thought expressed
41Compare here also (Landini, 1996) who offers numerous convincing examples of logical
identities that are not synonymous. Indeed, as one referee pointed out, one may raise
doubts about a potential synonymy claim with respect to another basic law, namely basic
law VI:
a = K—ε(a = ε)
Similar considerations as in the case of law V could be be used to show that the two sides
of basic law VI are not sense identical, however, I will postpone discussion of basic law VI
to another occasion.
42And, of course, there might be other independent reasons to reject [Logical Truth]
and to rule out this possible rejoinder.
43Compare the excellent (Blanchette, 2012), in particular pp.92ff. See also (Rossberg,
2015a) for a more detailed discussion of Blanchette’s interpretation of Frege’s analysis.
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by an arithmetical identity (analysandum), we require a transition from the
right-hand side of BLV to its left-hand side.
However, if Frege did not adopt [BLV Synonymy] and so the two sides of
BLV express distinct senses, the result of an analysis which draws on BLV
in this way cannot be such that the analysans and analysandum express
the exact same thought. Moreover, given compositionality the difference in
thought expressed has to be rooted in a difference in sense of one of the
subsentential expressions. As a result, a rejection of [BLV Synonymy] also
brings about a rejection of the possibility of providing a term by term sense-
preserving analysis, i.e. [Analysis].44
If this is correct, the above mentioned possibility of attempting to resur-
rect a revised version of the incompatible triad seems even less worrying. In
effect, on my interpretation, we will have to reject two of the three assump-
tions that make up the incompatible triad. What these observations nicely
show is just how important it is to get clear on Frege’s own views about basic
law V in order to understand the main tenets of his wider logicist programme.
However, this discussion gives rise to a no doubt far-reaching issue, which
is even more pressing now:45 if Frege did not entertain [BLV Synonymy]
on what basis did Frege accept BLV? By arguing against [BLV Synonymy]
to resolve the incompatible triad, I have ruled out a fairly straightforward,
albeit defeasible, explanation of the justified acceptance of this basic law.
Assuming that Frege regarded the two sides of BLV to be expressing different
senses, we require an alternative account of what makes this logical law
acceptable which is compatible with Frege’s conception of a basic logical law
more generally. Thus offering a way out of the incompatible triad by rejecting
[BLV Synonymy] can only ever be half of the story. The other half will be
to provide an alternative account of how Frege came to think of BLV as a
basic law of logic.46 However, this part of the story will have to be told on
another occasion.47
44This, of course, leaves it open whether Frege aimed for a weaker form of analysis, one
for example that merely requires term by term reference preservation. See also (Blanchette,
2012) for a discussion of the various forms an analysis could take and (Beaney, 1996)
for a comprehensive discussion of the problem of analysis in Frege. As an aside: this
observation raises some possible concerns for Blanchette’s own insightful proposal that
Frege was aiming for a weaker form of thought preservation of some basic truths, since it
seems to require the truth of [BLV Synonymy].
45An issue raised forcefully in (Milne, 1989).
46(Pedriali, 2016) offers an excellent overview of different Frege-inspired approaches to
the epistemology of basic laws of logic—some of these approaches are compatible with a
rejection of [BLV Synonymy].
47I would like to thank Roy T. Cook, Richard Heck, Peter Milne, Erich Reck, Marcus
Rossberg, Peter Sullivan, and Alexander Yates for commenting on earlier drafts of this
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